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Abstract
In Brazil generous public sector pensions have induced civil servants to retire on
average at age 55. In this paper we use an OLG model to assess the eﬀects of such
policy induced early retirement on capital accumulation and long-run income levels.
We calibrate the model to data from Brazil and then conduct policy experiments
changing the generosity of (early) public sector pensions. We ﬁnd that the current
generosity of public sector pensions which induces civil servants to retire 10 years
prematurely (at age 55 rather than at age 65) is often associated with decreases in
steady state output (GDP) of over 2 percent and welfare losses in the private sector
of more than 1 percent of consumption.
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11 Introduction
"Early" retirement has become common in the industrialized economies. As is evident
from table 1 from Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998a), eﬀective retirement age in the European
Union for men has dropped from about 66 in 1960 to about 61 in 1995, even though life
expectancy has increased by about 7 years in this period. The retirement age for women
has experienced a similar drop. In some instances the drop in labor force participation
among mature males has been spectacular. In France labor force participation of males
between the ages of 60 and 64 dropped from over 84% in 1960 to below 20% in 2000.
In the Netherlands the corresponding numbers are over 68% in 1960 and less than 18%
in 2000. Such early retirement provisions can be very costly. Table 2, which is taken
from Herbertsson and Orszag (2003), illustrates that such costs can be larger than 10%
of GDP.
Explanations for the drastic increase in early retirement can be found in Gruber and
Wise (1998, 1999), Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998a), Visco (2000), Herbertsson (2001),
Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2002), Herbertsson and Orszag (2003), Conde-Ruiz, Galasso
and Profeta (2005) and Wise (2005). These papers establish a credible empirical link
between the design of pension systems and early retirement decisions. Michel and
Pestieau (1999), Ahituv and Zeira (2000), Cremer and Pestieau (2003) and Fehr, Ster-
keby and Thogersen (2003) among others, use overlapping generations models to study
how social security policies inﬂuence retirement decisions. Rust and Phelan (1997) and
Jimenez-Martin and Sanchez (2003) estimate life cycle models with social security pro-
grams to assess the impact of these programs on retirement behavior. Kopecky (2005)
argues that early retirement among males in the US can be explained by an increase in
the real wage and a decrease in the price of leisure goods.
The literature on early retirement for the most part has focused on the industrialized
world and ignored developing countries. While this emphasis is justiﬁed to some degree,
generous pension schemes and early retirement issues are not wholly absent in developing
countries.
In Brazil for example, civil servants retired on average at the age of 54 in 2002 (it
was 49 in 1988). Figure 1 illustrates the retirement age distribution of civil servants of
the federal government.1 The public pension system in Brazil ranks among the most
generous in the world. Public sector pensioners account for about 5% of all pensioners,
yet receive about 50% of the value of all pension payments. The average contribution rate
to public section pensions, 11%, is far lower than the 27% contribution rate in the urban
private sector. According to Souza et al. (2004) the deﬁcit of the public sector pension
system amounts to 3.5% of private sector output. “Integrality” ensures that pensions
received equal the highest (last) income of the public sector employee. This level of
generosity was even surpassed in the military and police force, where the ﬁrst pension
payment matched the highest salary one pay grade higher. Phantom promotions just
before retirement may contribute even more to the generosity of public sector pensions.
“Parity” ensures that pension payments are indexed to wages of current civil servants.
After retiring from the civil service, workers are allowed to accept jobs in the private
1In 1998, a minimum retirement age for civil servants was established at age 53 for men and age 48
for women.
2sector and also receive public sector pensions.
There is a relatively small literature studying the macroeconomic eﬀect of pension
reform in developing countries generally or in Brazil speciﬁcally. Ferreira (2004) studies
social security reform in Brazil in the context of a small open economy. He ﬁnds large
welfare gains from social security reform. Ferreira (2005) studies the redistributional ef-
fect of social security reform along the transition in Brazil. Glomm et al. (2005) study the
macroeconomic eﬀects of generous public sector pensions, concentrating on opportunity
costs of foregone public education expenditure and infrastructure investment. They ab-
stract from early retirement eﬀects. In this paper we focus only on the early retirement
eﬀects of generous pensions to civil servants. We only consider one channel: Generosity
of public sector pensions causes early retirement which is costly and has to be ﬁnanced by
taxes, which in turn inﬂuence capital accumulation and long-run (steady state) income.
We use an overlapping generations model where a period is ﬁve years and where indi-
viduals become economically active at age 20 and die for sure at age 80. The government
hires civil servants and invests in a public capital that together produce a productive pub-
lic good. Retirement among civil servants may occur endogenously at ages 50,55,60 or
65 depending on the design of the pension system. Upon early retirement civil servants
are free to pursue employment in the private sector. All government expenditures are
ﬁnanced by taxes on labor and on capital income. The government budget is assumed
to be balanced in each period. We calibrate the model to data from Brazil. We calculate
steady state equilibria as well as transition paths between pre- and post reform steady
states.
In the calibrated model we calculate public pensions levels which leave civil servants
exactly indiﬀerent between the aforementioned retirement ages. We ﬁnd that decreasing
generosity of public sector pensions from levels where all civil servants retire at age 55 to
levels where they retire at age 65 increases steady state private sector output by about 2%
when capital tax rates adjust to clear the government budget and early retirees worked
40% of their time on average in the private sector. Eﬀects of similar magnitude are
obtained when the government adjusts the labor tax to clear the government budget.
We ﬁnd that the quantitative eﬀects are fairly robust to changes in the parameters.
Apart from a grand-fathering eﬀect, transitions indicate a smooth monotone progression
between steady state output levels.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3
contains the deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium. In section 4 we solve the model. In
section 5 we calibrate the model to Brazil and in section 6 we conduct policy experiments.
We conduct extensive sensitivity analysis for these policy reform experiments. Section 7
concludes. The appendix contains all tables and ﬁgures.
2 The Model
There is a large number of individuals who live for 12 periods in an OLG set-up. Each
period accounts for 5 years, with working life beginning at age 20 and life ending for sure
at age 80. There are two types of agents, public sector workers (or civil servants) and
private sector workers. For workers in the private sector retirement is assumed to occur
only after period J1 = 9, which corresponds to age 65. Agents retire for J2 = 3 periods,
3so that
J1 + J2 = 12.
While all workers in the private sector retire at period 9 (age 65), civil servants can retire
early, that is before period 9 (age 65).
All civil servants face the same wage scheme and pension scheme. The wage scheme
for civil servants is set by the government, and thus diﬀers from the market-determined
wage scheme for private sector workers. The pension scheme for civil servants diﬀers
from the scheme for private sector workers in contribution rates, in beneﬁt payments,
as well as the possibility of participating in an early retirement program. For them the
number of periods worked (J1 − Je) and the number of periods in retirement (J2 + Je) are
endogenous. The length of early retirement is denoted Je where we allow for Je = 0,1,2,3
early retirement periods. The number of early retirement periods is chosen endogenously
by public sector workers. Thus the starting period of early retirement is J1 −Je +1 and
the ﬁnal period of early retirement is J1. Standard retirement of public sector workers
starts at age J1 + 1 and lasts until J1 + J2 = 12. In this period all workers, public and
private are retired and not allowed to work anymore.
It is not uncommon in Brazil for public sector early retirees to take a job in the
private sector. The possibility of receiving pension payments while working elsewhere
constitutes a strong incentive for early retirement. According to Bonturi (2002) public
sector early retirees were even able to draw pension payments while working at a diﬀerent
public sector job. We account for this by letting public sector early retirees work in the
private sector for a fraction (1 − L) of their time. This choice is discrete: the public
sector retiree either works (1 − L) of the time in the private sector or not at all.






, ν = {p,g},
where βν
0,βν
2 < 0 and βν
1 > 0. This functional speciﬁcation allows for a hump-shaped
income-age proﬁle as shown in ﬁgure (2). Here and in the rest of the paper the super-
scripts p and g denote private sector workers and government workers (civil servants),
respectively. Once agents retire, their human capital stays constant by assumption. We
assume that for all cohorts at all time periods and all ages public sector wages exceed
those in the private sector in order to mimic the more generous public sector compensa-
tion scheme, but we maintain the assumption that all workers of a given age are equally
productive regardless of whether they work in the public or private sector.2
In each period there is an exogenous survival probability of cohort i which we denote
πi. The worker dies for sure after J periods and leaves an accidental bequest that is
taxed and redistributed to the newborn cohort by the government.3 Population grows
exogenously at net rate n. We assume stable demographic patterns so that similar to
Huggett (1996) age i agents make up a constant fraction  i of the entire population at
any point in time.
2This assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis of the model. Tran (2006) contains a more realistic
model of the choice between employment in the public or private sector.
3An alternative redistribution method is to divide the after tax bequests equally among all individuals
alive as in Huggett (1996). It turns out that the results are not aﬀected by the way the government
redistributes bequests.
4In addition, we assume that at time t there is a newborn generation whose size is
normalized to 1
J with initial human capital level h1t. Since agents face the probability of
dying (1 − π1) before age 20, the human capital "supplied" by this generation is 1
Jh1tπ1.
At time t + 1 the newborn cohort supplies (1 + n) 1
Jh1t+1π1 etc. If every cohort is born
with the same human capital level, so that h1t = h1t+1 (i.e., the shift factor Θ = 1) then
aggregate human capital follows
Ht+1 = (1 + n)Ht.
To simplify the notation we will from now on drop the time subscripts for individual
human capital. If we detrend human capital by (1 + n) we see that the share of human
capital of each cohort i as fraction of aggregate human capital, denoted as  it, stays





Since the population grows exogenously at rate n, we know that human capital, physical
capital and output all grow at rate n as well. The fraction dying each period (conditional





We assume that the government hires a constant fraction of each age cohort so that
the total number Ng of workers in the civil service is constant. With early retirement the
fraction of each cohort employed by the public sector has to increase in order to maintain
the absolute number Ng of workers in the public sector. We deﬁne ng as the fraction of






and np = (1 − ng).
Agents value a single consumption good and during the early retirement phase they also




















where cj,t+j−1 is consumption of the private good of an agent with age j at calendar time
t + j − 1.
The variable Lk,t+k−1 is the fraction of time consumed as leisure during the periods of
early retirement. It represents the average public sector retirees’ participation rate in the
private sector and is exogenous in the model. In this speciﬁcation of preferences, leisure
is introduced only as a vehicle that generates endogenous retirement decisions among
civil servants in the relevant age range. At J1 + 1 the agent transitions into "normal"
5retirement and hence we drop the variable for leisure in the utility functions, since all
agents, private and public, will be fully retired at that time, for J2 periods in total. We
assume 0 < θ.
The privately supplied good is produced from three inputs, the public good Gt, the
private capital stock Kt and eﬀective labor (human capital) in the private sector H
p
t









where αi ∈ (0,1) for i = 1,2,3, α2 + α3 = 1 and A > 0. Capital depreciates at rate δp
each period. The public good in the production function can be thought of as the stock
of public infrastructure such as toll free roads. This public good is made available to all
ﬁrms at a zero price. Speciﬁcations of the technology similar to this one have been used
by Barro (1990) and Turnovsky (1999), for example.
The government uses eﬀective labor (human capital) of civil servants and public
capital KG











where Z,χ > 0 and η ≤ 1. The fraction of civil servants contributing to the production
of the public good is denoted ωh ∈ (0,1). This set-up allows us to not only study the
costs of public sector compensation including pension beneﬁts but also the beneﬁts of
public sector employment. Public capital evolves according to
KG
t+1 = (1 − δg)KG
t + IG
t , (3)
where public investment IG
t is ﬁnanced through taxes on labor and capital income.
The government ﬁnances investment in public capital IG,t = ∆G,tYt, where ∆G,t is
the fraction of private sector output allocated to public investments. The governmental







In addition to the wage bill the government ﬁnances three kinds of transfers to the old.
The ﬁrst type of transfer payment is pension payments to private sector workers. These
private sector pensions are functions of current private sector wages and the payment
















Transfer payments to each public sector worker who retires early depend upon the re-





































6The government sets the pension replacement rates for the private sector Ψp as well
as the replacement rates for the public sector in the early retirement phase Ψ
g
1 and the
standard retirement phase Ψ
g
2. The replacement rates are deﬁned as a ﬁxed fraction of





be chosen to capture the principle of "integrality" in the public sector.





L,t, pension income is taxed at rate τR,t and accidental bequests are taxed
at τB,t. The government also taxes capital income qtKt at the rate τK,t, where qt is the









early retirees working in private sector














































Finally, we summarize the residual government expenditure as CG,t, in the amount
∆CG,tYt, where ∆CG,t is the fraction of private sector output allocated to residual spend-
ing in period t. Residual spending includes parts of government consumption (e.g. mil-
itary expenditure) and is needed to match government policy parameters. Government
consumption is thrown into the ocean. The government budget constraint is given by
∆CG,tYt + ∆G,tYt +
public wages








      
np  12






public pension during early retirement
      
ng  J1







public pension during standard retirement
      
ng  12






























      











      
accidental bequests
. (5)
When civil servants retire at J1, the case with standard retirement, the terms  
ng  J1




















out of the government budget constraint.
73 Equilibrium
3.1 Household Problem
We have two types of households whose utility maximization problems are not identical.
The private households cannot retire early so retirement age is not a choice variable. The







































































are transfers of accidental bequests to the newborn individual. Private households do
not enjoy leisure so that
L
p
k,t+k−1 = 0, for k = {J1 − Je,...,J1}.







is then calculated as residual from the period
budget constraints.
Public households have the possibility to retire early and the option to work a fraction
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k,t+k−1 ∈ (0,1), for k = {J1 − Je,...,J1}.








to maximize utility from expression (1) subject to the budget
constraint (8).
83.2 Firm Problem
The ﬁrm’s problem is standard. Given the level of public capital it chooses to hire















3.3 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium




















a competitive equilibrium with standard retirement is a collection of sequences of de-









and sequences of decisions of
publicly employed households of early retirement period {Je,j,t}
∞










where j = {1,...,12}, sequences of aggregate stocks of private




t=0 , sequences of aggregate stocks






















solves the maximization problem of the privately employed
household which is maximize (1) subject to (6), and the sequences {Je,j,t}
∞








solves the maximization problem of the publicly employed household
which is maximize (1) subject to (8),













Rt = (1 − τK,t)qt + 1 − δp,
(iii) capital markets clear4,
Kt+1 = St = np  12
j=1  js
p










public sector early retirees
working in private sector











4Since private and public sector workers are equally productive, we use vector h
p for both private and
public sector workers in the accumulation of producing human capital.






j,t + St + IG,t + CG,t = Yt,











(vi) and the government budget constraint (5) holds.
4 Solving the Model
4.1 Household’s Optimal Choice
Optimal Consumption and Saving
Private and public sector workers have diﬀering income streams over their life-cycle.
Due to the generosity of the public sector compensation scheme, lifetime income of public
sector workers is higher than that for private sector workers.6 Therefore, the government
can directly set the number of public sector workers Ng it wants to employ. The ﬁrst












λν for j = {1,...,12} and ν = {p,g},
where λv is the Lagrange multiplier from each household’s maximization problem. Sub-
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σ
,for ν = {p,g}, (10)















5Since the public good G is an input into private sector production of Y, the public sector wage bill
is already contained in the measure of Y. For simplicity we do not take net exports into account when
expressing policy parameters as percentage of GDP. Since according to ? net exports in Brazil are only
approximately 1.5% of GDP we think this is an acceptable compromise.
6Compare Terrell (1993), Assaad (1997), Glinskaya and Lokshin (2005) and Hyder and Reilly (2005)
for some accounts of generous public sector pay.
10Once we know the optimal consumption plans we use the period budget constraints of



































j,t+j−1 for j = {2,J1} and
s
p






j,t+j−1 for j = {J1 + 1,12 − 1}.






































j,t+j−1 for j = {2,J1 − Je},
s
g





















for j = {J1 − Je + 1,J1},
s
g










j,t+j−1 for j = {J1 + 1,J − 1}.
Optimal retirement age of public sector workers
The optimal retirement age or early retirement period of public sector workers can
be obtained by comparing their lifetime-utility conditioning on retirement age. This is





























2 and given all prices.
4.2 The Government
The government satisﬁes the budget constraint (5) each period. There is a number of
ways to achieve this. We assume that there is no labor tax discrimination between public




L,t = τL,t. We
assume that the government satisﬁes the budget constraint by adjusting either the capital
tax rate τK,t or the labor tax rate τL,t when civil servants’ retirement behavior changes.
Government consumption and government investment in the public good are expressed
as a fraction of GDP. Then the endogenous tax rate τK,t (τL,t or ∆G,t) is a function of
exogenous government policy variables and technology parameters only and it adjusts to
satisfy the budget constraint each period.
114.3 The Steady State Solutions and Transitions
The complexity of the model prevents us from obtaining any analytical solution. There-
fore, we calibrate the model to obtain some numerical results. First, we solve for steady
state equilibrium. The steady state solution is numerically obtained according to the
following algorithm based on Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987).
Algorithm 1 1. Guess an initial output Y and early retirement period for public
servants Je.




























3. Use the government budget constraint to solve for capital tax τK or labor tax τL.
Then use R = (1 − τK) Y
K + 1 − δp to solve for interest rate.
4. Household
(a) Using the household lifetime budget constraint to solve for lifetime incomes in
the two sectors: Ip and Ig.
(b) Solve for shadow prices λp and λg according to (10).




j for j = {1,J} according to (11).




j for J = {1,J − 1} according to (12).
(e) Solve for early retirement period Jnew
e for public sector workers according (14).
5. Use (9) to get aggregate steady state savings S and set Knew = S.
6. Calculate accidental bequests: TB,1,t according to (7)
7. Calculate Y new = AGα1 (Knew)
α2 (Hp)
α3 .
8. Update Y using the convex combination: Y = λY new + (1 − λ)Y, λ ∈ (0,1) and
Je = Jnew
e
9. Repeat until Y and Je converge.
12Next, we solve for transition. The approach to solve for the equilibrium transition
path is similar to that used to solve for steady state. However, it becomes more com-
plicated because we now have to solve for many diﬀerent maximization problems simul-
taneously in all transition periods7.
5 Calibration
We calibrate a 12 period OLG model to Brazilian data. In the model one period corres-
ponds to ﬁve years and agents become economically active at age 20 and die for sure at
age 80. The survival probabilities are calculated from Brazilian life-tables for the year
2001.8 The population growth is equal to n = 7.73% per period which corresponds to
an annual growth rate of 1.5%.9 In the calibration, retirement of workers in the public
sector occurs after period 7 at age 55 (this matches Brazilian data) and retirement of
private sector workers occurs after period 9 at age 65. Workers who work in the public
sector but do not have the status of a civil servant are counted as private sector workers.
We use the economic parameters reported in table 3 for this calibration. The discount
factor β takes a standard value. Estimates for the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution σ for Brazil range from 1 to 5 (see Issler and Piqueira (2000) and Soriano and
Nakane (2003)). We pick pick σ = 1.5 and perform sensitivity analysis. The preference
parameter θ is chosen to get the correct retirement age for the public sector which is 55
years at relatively high replacement ratios which match the Brazilian experience.
The fraction 1 − L that early retirees work in the private sector is set to 0.4. There
is no data available on the amount of work of early retirees. We therefore exogenously
set parameter L and conduct sensitivity analysis. Larger values of L will understate the
eﬀects of the reform. In order to not overstate our results we therefore conduct sensitivity
analysis of larger L values.
Total factor productivity A is normalized so that output is equal to 100 in the bench-
mark case. Standard estimates of capital’s share of GDP are around 0.3 (see Gollin
(2002)). Estimates for Brazil tend to be higher. Ferreira and do Nascimento (2005) use
a value of 0.4 for capital’s share of GDP in Brazil. We use the same value. This para-
meter speciﬁcation allows us to match the capital output ratio of Brazil which is around
3 (e.g. Bresser-Pereira (1990) and Souza-Sobrinho (2004)).10 The estimates for α1 for
the US cluster around 0 when panel data techniques are used (e.g. Hulten and Schwab
(1991) and Holtz-Eakin (1994)) and they cluster around 0.2 when GMM is used to es-
timate Euler equations (e.g. Lynde and Richmond (1993) and Ai and Cassou (1995)).
For a cross-section of low income countries including Latin American countries Hulten
7The algorithm is available upon request from the authors.
8The lifetables are available at the following WHO website:
http://www3.who.int/whosis/life/life_tables
9See the OECD Factbook 2006 - Economic, Environmental and Social Statist-
ics that also contains the annual growth rates for Brazil for the years 1981-2004 at
http://titania.sourceoecd.org/vl=3134242/cl=11/nw=1/rpsv/factbook/01-01-01-g02.htm
10Capital K is a stock variable, whereas output Y is a ﬂow variable over the ﬁve year period. In order
to calculate the capital output ratio we have to adjust for the number of years per period, so that K
Y/5 is
the capital output ratio that we report.
13(1996) obtains an estimate for α1 of 0.1. This is the value we use. The depreciation rate
of capital δp is set to match the capital output ratio and the interest rate.
We have little information on the parameters of the production technology for the
public good. We view the choice of Z = 1, χ = 1, η = 0.5 and ωh = 0.2 as our benchmark
and we perform sensitivity analysis on these parameters. We ﬁnd that our results are
fairly robust to the changes in Z,η,χ and ωh. Ferreira (2005) provides an estimation of
the wage-age proﬁle whj, where
hj = exp(−.2314 + .0529j − .0093j2),
and j = 1,2,...55 which is illustrated by the dashed line in ﬁgure 2. We use Ferreira’s
estimates directly for our private sector wage-age proﬁle and we use it to construct the
public sector wage-age proﬁle for our calibration. The public sector wage-age proﬁle
is higher than in the private sector reﬂecting the relative generosity of public sector
compensation. Furthermore, we assume that until retirement public sector wages are
rising with age.
The markup for public wages is ξ = 1.15 which captures the reality in Brazil that
public sector wages are higher than private sector wages. Foguel et al. (2000) report that
even if one accounts for the large share of low wage informal employment in the private
sector there is still a considerable markup left in public sector wages vs. formal private
sector wages. The parameters Ψp and Ψ
g
i, i = 1,2 can be thought of as gross replacement
rates of pension payments. They capture the relatively low replacement rates of private
sector pensions and the high replacement rates ensured by integrality and parity in the
public sector 11. The gross replacement rate for private sector workers is about 50% of
the wage payment in the last working period. For civil servants who retire early the
gross replacement ratio is about 94% of the wage payment in the last working period for
the early retirement years and then rises to 110% as age reaches 65 years. These high
replacement rates together with private sector income generates the bough in the income-
age proﬁle illustrated by the red dashed line in ﬁgure 2. For civil servants who retire at
age 65 the steep section of the income-age proﬁle captures "phantom promotions". After
retirement at age 65 income is ﬂat over the rest of the life-cycle. Retired civil servants
also have to pay income tax. We assume that this tax is equal to the labor tax of active
workers.
The public policy parameters used for our calibration are contained in table 4. In
our model public investment is 2.5% of private sector output. This is close to a value
reported by Calderon and Serven (2003). In our model government residual expenditures,
net of the wage bill for civil servants, constitute 20% of private sector output. The labor
11Bonturi (2002) reports that a private sector worker that actively contributed to the pension system
will receive roughly 80% of her highest wage or salary as pension payment. If the worker did not
contribute to the system during her worklife she is still entitled to get a minimum pension that is equal
to the minimum wage level after reaching retirement age. This is an anti poverty measure and concerns
mostly rural sector workers who are roughly 30% of private sector retirees. Only half of the private
sector labor force contributes to the pension system. Almost all workers in the informal sector, like rural
workers and domestic employees, do not contribute. In 1999, there were close to 18 million recipients
of social security transfers and roughly one-third of them got the minimum wage level transfer. In our
model, we index retirement beneﬁts.of private sector workers to the last wage income (the highest one).
In order to match the data we need to choose a very small value Ψ
r.
14and capital tax rates used here are the same as those used by Ferreira and do Nascimento
(2005). The fraction of civil servants (without early retirement) is ﬁxed exogenously at
7%.
Table 5 contains Brazilian data that our model output matches. The public sector
wage bill is 5.1% of private sector output. Pensions for civil servants are 2.9% of private
sector output and private pensions are 6.3% of private sector output. These numbers
are close to the numbers reported in Souza et al. (2004). Government size is 36.8%,
measured as tax revenue in percent of private sector output and the capital output ratio
is close to 3 as reported above. The fraction of civil servants per age cohort is 8.36%
with two early retirement periods.
6 Policy Experiments, Sensitivity Analysis and Welfare
Analysis
In this section we report the results of policy reforms. We begin with an economy in its
steady state under the policy parameters from table 4. We then introduce a permanent
and unexpected change in the generosity parameter Ψ
g
1 and calculate the transitional
path and the new steady state. We describe two scenarios. In the ﬁrst the government
used capital taxes to clear the government budget constraint, in the second labor taxes
are used to adjust the budget constraint.
We ﬁnd that decreasing the generosity of civil servants’ pensions increases output in
all cases we consider. There are three eﬀects causing this result. They all work in the
same direction. First, decreasing civil servants’ retirement pay induces them to retire
later, which in turn increases human capital in both private and public sectors, which
ultimately raises private sector output. Second, cutting civil servants’ retirement pay
increases their incentive to save, which in turn increases the stock of physical capital
and hence output. Third, decreasing civil servants’ retirement pay allows for smaller tax
distortions which also increases output.
6.1 Capital Tax Adjusts to Clear the Government Budget Constraint
In ﬁgure 4 we report the public agents’ retirement decision in the steady state as a
function of the generosity parameter of early retirement pension payments Ψ
g
1 when
capital taxes adjust to clear the government budget constraint. Of course these decisions
depend upon leisure L. Since we do not have data on L we conduct extensive sensitivity
analysis on this parameter as reported in table 6 and table 7. When Ψ
g
1 is small public
sector workers do not want to retire early since their welfare of working up to age 65
exceeds their welfare from early retirement. If Ψ
g
1 is below 0.886, public sector pensions
are not generous enough so that public sector workers prefer to work up to their standard
retirement age of 65. As the generosity of early retirement beneﬁts increases beyond 0.886
agents prefer to retire one period early, that is at age 60. If Ψ
g
1 increases further and
exceeds 0.938 public sector workers would like to retire two periods early at age 55 and
ﬁnally if Ψ
g
1 exceeds 0.984 all public sector workers would prefer to retire three periods
early at age 50. Of course these outcomes depend crucially on the weight θ individuals
15attach to leisure in the utility function. We choose θ so that in accordance with actual
policy in Brazil early retirement pay is close to full retirement pay and civil servants
retire at age 55 (2 periods early).
Table 6 contains the replacement rates which leave civil servants just indiﬀerent
between the possible early retirement ages. If the early retirement replacement ratio Ψ
g
1
drops below 0.938 for example in row 1, then civil servants retire at age 60 instead of at
age 55. Table 6 also shows how sensitive these critical replacement ratios are to changes
in the economic parameters.
The ﬁrst main result is reported in table 7. There the benchmark case we consider
is highlighted in bold. In the calibration steady state output for the benchmark case
is normalized to 100 by choosing the appropriate total factor productivity A. When we
conduct sensitivity analysis we do not change the total factor productivity, however, we
use the entries in the third column (the 2 early retirement period case) to normalize
output over all retirement periods for a given parameter setting. It is then easy to
compare respective steady state output rates for various early retirement periods.
In the policy reforms considered in table 7 the capital tax rate adjusts to satisfy the
government budget constraint. We see from table 7 that a permanent and unexpected
decline in the early retirement replacement ratio increases steady state output by over 2%.
This result is relatively robust to changes in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
σ and the elasticity of substitution in public production η. Notice that an increase in
leisure L magniﬁes the eﬀects of this reform: When L = 1, output rises by 3.5% when
public sector pensions become less generous. If the productivity of infrastructure capital
α1 is higher the eﬀect of this policy reform is larger as well.
In ﬁgure 5 we report the transitions caused by a policy change in the generosity of
early retirement payments. Our benchmark case is early retirement at age 55, that is
2 periods early, at generosity Ψ
g
1 = 0.938. We next change Ψ
g
1 from 0.938 down to 0.82
so that all public agents would like to continue working until age 65. The line marked
x describes this transition for the capital tax rate in panel 1, output in panel 2, capital
in panel 3. Decreasing the generosity and enticing agents to not retire early increases
steady state output by 2.130% after a transition period of 15 periods (75 years). See also
table 7 top row for this result.
We then conduct the same experiment by changing the generosity again down to
Ψ
g
1 = 0.886 so that all civil servants want to retire one period early at age 60. The
line marked with triangles reports the transitions. Steady state output now increases by
1.182%.
Finally, we make public pensions more generous by raising Ψ
g
1 to 0.984 so that public
sector workers retire three periods early at age 50. This policy generates retirement ages
that match the data from the late 1980s. The resulting trajectory is illustrated by the
diamond line. Output decreases from 100 to 98.469 over the transition period.
In ﬁgure 6 we illustrate the eﬀects of these reforms on public sector pensions, on
private sector pensions and on public sector wages. We show both absolute changes and
changes in these variables as fraction of private sector output (GDP). Note in the top
panel of ﬁgure 6 that public sector pensions decrease sharply from almost 3% of private
sector output to 1.5% of private sector output but only after seven periods. This delay
is due to grandfathering of current civil servants.
16Private pensions rise gradually. Immediately after the policy reform private sector
wages increase and since pensions are indexed to private wages, private pension payments
rise. The increase in private pensions in absolute terms becomes more drastic after
grandfathering has disappeared after 7 periods. Notice that initially private pensions
as a fraction of output falls since private sector output rises faster. After 50 years (10
periods) private sector pensions become larger even as a fraction of GDP.
Public sector wages fall at ﬁrst and rise after seven periods both in absolute terms
and as a fraction of private sector output. The initial decline in the public sector wage
bill is due simply to an accounting identity. Since civil servants now (after the reform)
work for 9 periods rather than 7 periods, fewer civil servants will be hired from each
generation to keep the total public sector employment constant in the long run. This
decline again lasts for seven periods. After seven periods, the public sector wage bill rises
and reaches a level higher than the pre-reform level. This rise to a higher level is due to
larger tenure of civil servants and human capital rising with tenure.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the case where early retirees are not allowed to work in
the private sector. These results correspond to row 3 in table 6 and table 7 when leisure
L = 1. Reducing the early retirement replacement rates for civil servants from 0.938 to
some value below 0.886 results in civil servants retiring at age 65. This in turn triggers
a 3.5% increase in GDP.
6.2 Labor Taxes Adjust to Clear the Government Budget Constraint
Tables 8 and 9 illustrate the eﬀects of the policy reform when the labor tax adjusts
instead of the capital tax to satisfy the government budget constraint. As is evident
from table 9, the eﬀects of changing the generosity of public sector pensions are smaller
when these changes are ﬁnanced by a change in a labor tax. In the benchmark case
inducing civil servants to retire at age 65 instead of age 55 increases steady state output
by roughly 1.6%.
Figure 4 illustrates the public agents’ retirement decision in the steady state as a
function of the generosity parameter of early retirement pension payments Ψ
g
1 when labor
taxes adjust to clear the government budget constraint. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the
transitions to the new steady state when the change in the generosity of civil servants’
pensions is accompanied by a change in the labor tax. The qualitative eﬀects of this
particular policy reform are very similar to the previous result. Note however that the
eﬀects on output are smaller. Furthermore, when the labor tax adjusts to satisfy the
government budget, the eﬀects on the real wage rate are non-monotonic. At ﬁrst the
real wage drops, but then after about 35 years (7 periods) the real wage rate starts to
increase to its new and higher steady state level.
6.3 Welfare Analysis
Figure 12 reports compensating consumption levels per age cohort to make agents in-
diﬀerent between the benchmark case and the regime without early retirement of civil
servants. We ﬁrst record the present value welfare levels of each cohort over the trans-
ition period for the case without a policy change, that is civil servants retire at age
55 throughout the ’transition’ period. Second, we record welfare levels for each cohort
17when the government administers a change in the pension compensation scheme of civil
servants that induces them to retire at age 65. We then calculate the average per period
compensating consumption for each generation that equalizes their respective lifetime
welfare. In ﬁgure 12 we illustrate the average percentage of current value compensating
consumption over current value consumption for each age cohort. We distinguish between
private (red circles), public (blue triangles) and aggregate (black x’s) welfare levels. We
see that civil servant generations that are born before the policy change beneﬁt from it
because of grandfathering. Private sector workers also beneﬁt because of higher GDP.
In the long run these welfare gains are approximately 1% of private sector workers. Civil
servants that are born after the policy shock loose because of the lower compensation
scheme, the longer working time and the slow adjustments during the transitions. In the
aggregate the economy is better oﬀ in the new policy regime.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the eﬀects of generous early retirement provision for civil
servants on capital accumulation and long-run level of income. We have used an OLG
economy calibrated to Brazil for this purpose. We found that decreasing early retirement
beneﬁts so that average retirement age among civil servants rises from the current 55
years to 65 years raises steady state income by over 2%. The transition lasts about 25
periods or 125 years. Decreasing generosity of early retirement beneﬁts more moderately
so that civil servants retire at age 60 raises long-run income by about 1.2%. When civil
servants who retire early are not allowed to work in the private sector during early
retirement the income gains from reducing generosity of early retirement are larger at
about 3.5%.
For the purpose of this analysis we have required the government budget to be bal-
anced each period and we have not allowed the government to run a deﬁcit. We also
abstracted from the potentially important issue of population ageing and from any dis-
tributional issues of public sector pension reform. Finally, we did not consider elastic
labor supply of the working age population in order to keep the model simple. We leave
these extensions for future work.
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21Men Women
Life Retirement Life Retirement
expectancy age expectancy age
1960-65 95-2000 1960 1995 1960-65 95-2000 1960 1995
Belgium 67.9 73.8 63.3 57.6 73.9 80.6 60.8 54.1
France 67.6 74.2 64.5 59.2 74.5 82.0 65.8 58.3
Germany 67.4 73.9 65.2 60.5 72.9 80.2 62.3 56.1
Ireland 68.4 73.6 68.1 63.4 72.3 79.2 70.8 60.1
Italy 67.4 75.0 64.5 60.6 72.6 81.2 62.0 57.2
Spain 67.9 74.5 67.9 61.4 72.7 81.5 68.0 58.9
Sweden 71.6 76.3 66.0 63.3 75.6 80.8 63.4 62.1
UK 67.9 74.5 66.2 62.7 73.8 79.8 62.7 59.7
Table 1: Longevity and eﬀective retirement age in the European Union (1960-1995) in
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998a) . Original Source: United Nations Population Division,
World Population Prospects, 1998.
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010
Hungary − − 16.5 19.4 Ireland 4.6 6.9 6.8 8.9
Belgium − 15.2 14.1 17.9 Australia 7.5 7.5 8.1 11.1
Luxemburg − 12.5 12.6 15.1 Canada 5.5 6.7 7.2 10.5
Austria − − 14.4 15.9 Sweden 5.9 4.7 5.2 7.5
Germany 7.8 9.5 13.2 12.6 USA 5.6 5.4 5.7 8.1
Greece − 10.4 10.7 11.2 New Zealand − 7.9 7.8 11.6
Czech Republic − − 11.1 15.2 Turkey − 5.0 4.0 5.1
France 6.2 11.2 10.3 15.1 Japan 2.8 4.3 5.4 7.5
Netherlands 8.1 10.5 11.1 15.9 Norway 5.0 4.9 5.2 8.1
Poland − − 7.7 11.1 Switzerland − 2.9 6.7 9.3
Finland 8.2 9.6 10.6 15.8 Korea − 2.2 3.7 5.0
Spain 4.8 9.7 9.3 11.1 Mexico − 2.1 2.8 3.7
Portugal 6.0 9.1 8.6 9.4 Ireland − 0.5 1.6 2.2
Denmark − 6.9 8.2 11.3
UK − 7.5 7.2 10.1 OECD Average 5.3 6.7 7.1 9.1
Table 2: Costs of Early Retirement as fraction of GDP in some OECD countries in
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A = 18.38 Normalization, so that Y = 100
α1 = 0.1 Hulten (1996)
α2 = 0.4 Ferreira and do Nascimento (2005)
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Table 3: Preference and Policy Parameters
23Variables for Benchmark Case Je = 2 Source
Policies:
∆G
Investment in public good
(in % of private sector output)
2.5% Calderon and Serven (2003)
∆Cg
Government residual expenditure
(in % of private sector output)
20%
Social Security Ministry of Brazil (2002)
and authors’ calculation
Ψp Indexation parameter
(generosity of private pensions)
0.5 Based on Bonturi (2002)
ξ
Public wages as a
fraction of private wages














τL Labor tax rate 40% Ferreira and do Nascimento (2005)
τP Income tax when retired 40%
τB Tax on bequests 40%
τK capital tax rate 16.9% Ferreira and do Nascimento (2005)
Labor Allocation:
Ng fraction of civil servants 7% Social Security Ministry of Brazil (2002)
Np private sector employees 93%
Table 4: Policy Parameters
24Variables for Benchmark Case Je = 2 Source
K





(in % of private sector output)
36.82%
Immervoll et al. (2006)
report 35% of GDP.
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Wage bill public sector workers
(in % of private sector output)
5.1%









(in % of private sector output)
2.9%
Souza et al. (2004)




(in % of private sector output)
6.3%
Souza et al. (2004)
report 6.6% of GDP.
Table 5: Model Outcomes that Match Brazilian Data
25Je: 1 (age 60) 2 (age 55) 3 (age 50)
L:
0.60 0.886 0.938 0.984
0.80 1.056 1.141 1.219
1 1.226 1.343 1.467
σ:
0.50 0.847 0.945 1.049
1 0.866 0.938 1.010
1.50 0.886 0.938 0.984
2 0.794 0.847 0.886
α1:
0 0.847 0.892 0.932
0.05 0.866 0.912 0.958
0.1 0.886 0.938 0.984
0.15 0.912 0.964 1.017
0.2 0.951 1.004 1.062
η:
-2 0.879 0.971 1.049
-1 0.879 0.971 1.049
0 0.879 0.958 1.017
0.50 0.886 0.938 0.984
0.80 0.886 0.938 0.977
Z:
0.5 0.886 0.938 0.984
1 0.886 0.938 0.984
1.5 0.886 0.938 0.984
2 0.886 0.938 0.984
3 0.886 0.938 0.977
χ:
0.5 0.886 0.938 0.977
1 0.886 0.938 0.984
1.5 0.886 0.938 0.984
2 0.886 0.938 0.984
3 0.886 0.938 0.984
ωh:
0.1 0.886 0.938 0.984
0.2 0.886 0.938 0.984
0.3 0.886 0.938 0.984
0.4 0.886 0.938 0.984
0.5 0.886 0.938 0.984
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis: Replacement rates for early retirees that leave civil servants
just indiﬀerent between various retirement ages when capital tax adjusts.
26Je: 0 (age 65) 1 (age 60) 2 (age 55) 3 (age 50)
L:
0.60 102.127 101.178 100.000 98.480
0.80 102.813 101.594 100.000 97.870
1 103.509 102.018 100.000 97.207
σ:
0.50 102.301 101.314 100.000 98.165
1 102.189 101.229 100.000 98.352
1.50 102.127 101.178 100.000 98.480
2 101.889 101.051 100.000 98.649
α1:
0 101.694 100.933 100.000 98.800
0.05 101.886 101.039 100.000 98.648
0.1 102.127 101.178 100.000 98.480
0.15 102.421 101.339 100.000 98.256
0.2 102.820 101.556 100.000 97.962
η:
-2 102.252 101.357 100.000 98.070
-1 102.252 101.357 100.000 98.070
0 102.200 101.282 100.000 98.266
0.50 102.127 101.178 100.000 98.480
0.80 102.125 101.174 100.000 98.508
Z:
0.5 102.127 101.178 100.000 98.479
1 102.127 101.178 100.000 98.480
1.5 102.127 101.177 100.000 98.480
2 102.127 101.177 100.000 98.481
3 102.127 101.177 100.000 98.501
χ:
0.5 102.126 101.176 100.000 98.504
1 102.127 101.178 100.000 98.480
1.5 102.128 101.179 100.000 98.475
2 102.129 101.181 100.000 98.471
3 102.131 101.185 100.000 98.462
ωh:
0.1 102.126 101.176 100.000 98.483
0.2 102.127 101.178 100.000 98.480
0.3 102.128 101.178 100.000 98.478
0.4 102.128 101.179 100.000 98.476
0.5 102.128 101.180 100.000 98.475
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis: Steady state eﬀects of changing generosity of early pension
payments when capital tax adjusts.
27Je: 1 (age 60) 2 (age 55) 3 (age 50)
L:
0.60 0.978 1.020 1.048
0.80 1.176 1.246 1.303
1 1.360 1.459 1.543
σ:
0.50 0.865 0.949 1.020
1 0.907 0.978 1.020
1.50 0.978 1.020 1.048
2 0.978 1.006 1.020
α1:
0 0.949 0.992 1.006
0.05 0.964 1.006 1.034
0.1 0.978 1.020 1.048
0.15 1.006 1.048 1.077
0.2 1.034 1.077 1.105
η:
-2 0.978 1.077 1.147
-1 0.978 1.077 1.147
0 0.978 1.048 1.105
0.50 0.978 1.020 1.048
0.80 0.978 1.020 1.048
Z:
0.5 0.978 1.020 1.048
1 0.978 1.020 1.048
1.5 0.978 1.020 1.048
2 0.978 1.020 1.048
3 0.978 1.020 1.048
χ:
0.5 0.978 1.020 1.048
1 0.978 1.020 1.048
1.5 0.978 1.020 1.048
2 0.978 1.020 1.048
3 0.978 1.020 1.063
ωh:
0.1 0.978 1.020 1.048
0.2 0.978 1.020 1.048
0.3 0.978 1.020 1.048
0.4 0.978 1.020 1.048
0.5 0.978 1.020 1.048
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis: Replacement rates for early retirees that leave civil servants
just indiﬀerent between various retirement ages when labor tax adjusts.
28Je: 0 (age 65) 1 (age 60) 2 (age 55) 3 (age 50)
L:
0.60 101.612 100.878 100.000 98.921
0.80 102.154 101.201 100.000 98.466
1 102.685 101.519 100.000 98.013
σ:
0.50 101.237 100.687 100.000 99.115
1 101.416 100.784 100.000 99.022
1.50 101.612 100.878 100.000 98.921
2 101.738 100.939 100.000 98.864
α1:
0 101.308 100.712 100.000 99.146
0.05 101.447 100.788 100.000 99.031
0.1 101.612 100.878 100.000 98.921
0.15 101.831 100.996 100.000 98.779
0.2 102.103 101.143 100.000 98.605
η:
-2 101.824 101.106 100.000 98.456
-1 101.824 101.105 100.000 98.457
0 101.725 100.999 100.000 98.661
0.50 101.612 100.878 100.000 98.921
0.80 101.607 100.873 100.000 98.931
Z:
0.5 101.612 100.878 100.000 98.920
1 101.612 100.878 100.000 98.921
1.5 101.612 100.878 100.000 98.921
2 101.611 100.877 100.000 98.922
3 101.611 100.877 100.000 98.922
χ:
0.5 101.609 100.875 100.000 98.927
1 101.612 100.878 100.000 98.921
1.5 101.614 100.881 100.000 98.915
2 101.617 100.883 100.000 98.909
3 101.621 100.888 100.000 98.873
ωh:
0.1 101.610 100.876 100.000 98.924
0.2 101.612 100.878 100.000 98.921
0.3 101.613 100.879 100.000 98.918
0.4 101.614 100.880 100.000 98.916
0.5 101.615 100.881 100.000 98.914
Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis: Steady state eﬀects of changing generosity of early pension
payments when labor tax adjusts.



















percentage of retirement population
Figure 1: Source: Ministry of the Budget and Administration, 2002. Distribution of
early retirement per age group in the public sector.
































Figure 2: Income-age proﬁles of private and public sector workers when public sector
early retirees are working 40% of their time in the private sector. Source for dashed line:
Ferreira (2005)



































Figure 3: Income-age proﬁles of private and public sector workers when public sector
early retirees are not working in the private sector. Source for dashed line: Ferreira
(2005)

































































































Figure 5: Transition from retiring early at 50, 55 and 60 to 65 with early retirees working
on average 40% of their time in the private sector. Capital tax τK adjusts to clear the
government budget constraint.




















































































































































Figure 6: Transition from retiring early at 50, 55 and 60 to 65 with early retirees working
on average 40% of their in the private sector. Capital tax τK adjusts to clear the
government budget constraint.




































































Figure 7: Transition from retiring early at 50, 55 and 60 to 65 with early retirees not
working in the private sector. Capital tax τK adjusts to clear the government budget
constraint.



















































































































































Figure 8: Transition from retiring early at 50, 55 and 60 to 65 with early retirees not
working in the private sector. Capital tax τK adjusts to clear the government budget
constraint.




































































































Figure 10: Transition from retiring early at 50, 55 and 60 to 65 with early retirees working
on average 40% of their time in the private sector. Labor tax τL adjusts to clear the
government budget constraint.












































































































































Figure 11: Transition from retiring early at 50, 55 and 60 to 65 with early retirees
working on average 40% of their in the private sector. Labor tax τL adjusts to clear the
government budget constraint.











































































Figure 12: Compensating consumption given to individuals to oﬀset the policy change
that induces civil servants to postpone their retirement from age 55 to 65 in terms of
life-time welfare per age cohort, expressed as the average percentage of current value per
period compensating consumption over current value consumption.
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